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THE "SIXTY-SEVEN REASONS" OF THE NAVY LEAGUE

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ARGUMENTS SET FORTH
IN BEHALF OF NAVAL EXTENSION

BY

EDWARD BENJAMIN KREHBIEL
PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY
IN STANFORD UNIVERSITY

"Overgrown military establishments are, under any form of government, inauspicious to liberty, and are to be regarded as peculiarly hostile to republican liberty."—WASHINGTON

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THE SIXTY-SEVEN REASONS OF THE NAVY LEAGUE

EDWARD BENJAMIN KREHBIEL

The Navy League of the United States has just issued a "petition for legislation reorganizing the personnel of the navy." The petition also recommends the adoption of "A continuing and consistent program of naval construction, to be determined by a Council of National Defense duly authorized by Congress. To fix the country's standard, the proposed Council of National Defense should take into consideration the naval programs and military strength of possible opponents."

No one is likely to take exception to a proposal to establish a commission to investigate the actual needs of this country for defense. On the contrary, the great majority of citizens will approve of an honest investigation of these needs. As far, then, as this is contemplated, the authors of the suggestion deserve commendation.

Unhappily, the circular of the Navy League indicates that the League is interested in having the navy enlarged, instead of having the need of enlargement investigated. This appears from the fact that it recommends: "a continuing and consistent program of naval construction, to be determined by a Council of National Defense"; which, then, would see that the navy grew, rather than "fix the country's standard" according to our needs. That this is the purpose of the proposed commission is made clear by the circumstance that the circular gives "sixty-seven reasons and aphorisms" for *a strong navy* — not for the

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creation of a commission to investigate our need of a strong navy.

Now, however warmly we should welcome an impartial and honest report upon our needs in relation to other states, we must instantly and positively reject a proposal to appoint a commission whose program and recommendations are prescribed. There are now enough forces promoting militarism, without a commission which, pretending to examine the question of defense, will render a foreordained verdict, and will receive credit merely because it is official. The country is better off with special interests and special pleas stripped of an official cloak.

The circular in question advocates a "strong navy." What that means is nowhere indicated. That our present navy is not regarded as strong, appears from the fact that the League is active; for if our fleet were considered adequate, there would be no purpose in the activities of the League. From this it appears that what is desired by the promoters of this commission is a navy that shall be *stronger* than the one we now have.

The sixty-seven reasons¹ (there are really only sixty-six) consist of short sentences or quotations, often axiomatic in form, postulating the broadest generalizations. Many of them in a single line assert a world of untruth or half-truth, and it would take pages to furnish convincing proof of their fallacy. In many cases the reasons are no reasons at all, for, even granting them to be true, they have no bearing on the question whether or not our present navy is strong or whether it ought to be increased.

The reasons may be grouped under the following headings, each representing one of the grounds upon which the demand for a "strong navy" is based:

¹These are given in the appendix beyond. For purposes of convenience of reference, numbers have been given to them.

1. Opinions and quotations (12, 13, 17, 49, 50, 57, 58, 59, 60, 64, 65, 66), the service the navy renders 2. to commerce and trade (26, 32, 35, 36), 3. to science and invention (27, 37, 39, 41, 42, 43), 4. to education (28, 29, 30), 5. to the general welfare (2, 33, 34, 38, 40, 44, 45, 47, 56), 6. to economy [the navy as insurance] (25, 31), 7. the inadequacy of other means (51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 60), 8. American diplomacy and policies (18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 46, 48, 52), 9. history (1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11), 10. the uncertainty of the future (61, 62, 63), 11. national defense (12, 13, 14, 15, 16).

A dozen of the reasons are merely opinions or quotations. An opinion, however bluntly or epigrammatically stated, is not an argument; and it does not improve the situation to give some one's else opinion in quotation marks.

"The navy is our main defense," is not an axiomatic truth, even if it is so stated; it is an opinion. It can be asserted with greater assurance that square dealing and sound business and a healthy body politic are our main defense.

"Naval power is a legitimate factor in international settlements, because it is the evidence of national efficiency." Even if the second part of this proposition be granted, the first is not the necessary conclusion. However, the second part is not true. Naval power may be one of many indications of national efficiency, but it is not "the evidence." If it were, how came Carthage, which indisputably had supreme naval power at the outset of the ancient conflict, to succumb to Rome? And who dares to defend the proposition that Switzerland, Holland or the United States are less efficient nations than Great Britain, which notoriously has the naval power?

"Better to be despised for too anxious apprehensions than be ruined by too confident security." There promises to be ruin in the train of the present policy of "anxious apprehensions," — financial ruin. It is precisely this ruin that anti-naval expansionists seek to avert.

Washington is quoted in behalf of a strong navy: "There is a rank due to the United States among nations which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost, by the reputation of weakness. If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it. If we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war." These words were uttered over a hundred years ago, when our country was in its very infancy, when it had practically no navy at all, when it had possible foes on the frontiers, and when Europe was distinctly hostile. Those conditions are no more. Even if Washington's words be taken prophetically—instead of being applied to the conditions of the time when spoken—they say nothing in favor of a navy larger than the one we now have! We have rank, and are able to repel insult; and we have no reputation for weakness. Furthermore, peace is in this very quotation pronounced to be a great boon; and what Washington thought of war can best be told in his own words directed to the Marquis de la Rouerie: "My first wish is (although it is against the profession of arms, and would clip the wings of some of our young soldiers who are soaring after glory) to see the whole world in peace, and the inhabitants of it as one band of brothers striving who should contribute most to the happiness of mankind." In his farewell address, Washington further said: "Overgrown military establishments are, under any form of government, inauspicious to liberty, and are to

be regarded as particularly hostile to republican liberty." Washington is hardly the man to quote in favor of naval expansion!

Reason 59 is an anonymous quotation: "Obviously the permanent peace of the world can be secured only through the gradual concentration of preponderant military strength into the hands of the most pacific communities." This statement is undoubtedly one of the League's "aphorisms," for it corresponds with Webster's definition of an aphorism as "a sharply defined sentence relating to abstract truth rather than to practical matters." For is anything more visionary than the proposal to continue military rivalry and war to the date when the pacific communities shall emerge as supreme? Even if the proposal were accepted, one would be compelled to ask when the preponderant military strength would be more in the hands of pacific communities than to-day. Certainly England, France, Germany and the United States have the preponderant military strength; and, according to the professions of their statesmen and military representatives, they are pacific. And if they are not pacific in fact, to whom will the Navy League have us look? Then, too, this position is altogether incompatible with reason 13: "Undefended resources invite aggression." China is presumably a case in point: "China's policy of evading militarism on both land and sea has been accompanied by disastrous defeats and untold humiliation." If this is true, at whose hands? At the hands of the "pacific communities" mentioned above who have naval power, such as the Navy League advocates. China furnishes the best evidence of the insincerity of the plea of a navy to be used for national defense only. When the true history of China for the last fifty years is written it will not be the credit of China that suffers.

"The money for American battleships is paid to American workingmen, American builders, and American craftsmen." This means that, to give more work at home, we should increase our navy. The doctrine is dangerous. It ought first to be shown that it is proper for the government to tax all of us in order to give employment to some of us; and, then, that navy-building is the only way in which the government can find employment. And neither of these can be proven.

The circular of the Navy League justifies its proposals on the ground that the demands of the navy have stimulated invention; that the navy has participated in arctic exploration and relief, in the Coast and Geodetic Survey, in the establishment of lighthouses, in work of the Weather Bureau, and has done work for the Hydrographic Office and on the Isthmian Canal route; it even mentions the relief work done in the earthquakes at Messina, Martinique, and San Francisco as arguments for a strong navy. All these activities are most commendable; but it would seem that the attempt to advance them as reasons for a strong navy would fail from the sheer weight of absurdity. No one will grant that the present expensive navy was needed for these purposes; for most, if not all, of it was done by small vessels—and dreadnaughts can by no stretch of imagination be made essential to work of this kind. As for the benefits of navy building on the production of high-grade steel, it were well to remember that the Iroquois Theatre fire in Chicago, and the Titanic disaster taught useful lessons—but wholesome by-products do not prove the wholesomeness of the source from which they spring. And this is especially the case when there are other ways of achieving the same end. Invention has flourished enormously

apart from the army and navy. A navy equipped with instruments for killing is not necessary to stimulate invention. A small fraction of the cost of our fleet offered annually in bonuses for useful inventions would have the same effect; for the inventor works for the sake of the reward, not for the love of the navy.

Even more extravagant is the *dictum*: "The navy is a school of efficiency, teaching many trades; teaching discipline and cleanliness to young men, a large portion of whom are so young that they can hardly be considered as producing units. The navy as a trade school has been called 'Our Great National University.' It returns to civil life annually as many trained, efficient, and patriotic young men as are graduated from the five leading universities of the country." At the very least, this is bland. That such an assertion can be made, shows that respect for American intelligence is not the foundation on which this particular plea for armament rests. The actual cost of the navy for 1912 was about \$130,000,000. This sum is many times what all our universities and colleges consume per year. The slightest fraction of that money could secure all the efficiency, discipline, cleanliness, and education which the navy professes to teach. And do these efficient graduates of the navy, whose training is paid for by the government, render the country services that are commensurate to the money spent on them, or to the service rendered by ordinary college graduates who have to pay their own way? The former ought, in justice, to serve their country incomparably more ably and abundantly than college graduates, for they have received their "education" at the public charge, at vastly greater cost.

Again, the navy is justified by the police work it has done, in suppressing the Barbary pirates, the African

slave trade, in protecting the fur seals, and our missionaries and citizens abroad, in suppressing insurrections in the West Indies and the Southern republics. Everyone favors the enforcement of law and the suppression of disorder, the peace advocate before all others. He is particularly interested in the maintenance of law and order and the suppression of lawlessness and force. Hence he will be the first to favor a military or naval force that is *designed and necessary to maintain law and order*. But to say that maintaining order is a good thing does not lead to the conclusion that we need a larger navy. Logic remains logic even here. It does not follow that because our army did splendid police duty at the time of the San Francisco fire, it should be made larger than it is or than Germany's.

As to the Barbary pirates, they were suppressed a hundred years ago and by a dozen vessels, all of them small compared with modern ships. How, then, can anyone mention the Barbary pirates to prove the need for a larger navy to-day? If the case of the pirates proves anything in this connection it is that the navy is very much overgrown; for where are the pirates against whom our present navy can pretend to protect us? The introduction of steam vessels contributed as much to suppressing piracy as did navies. Piracy is a thing of the past. African slave trade is no more. No navy of the size of ours is necessary to protect fur seals. No navy of any size can prevent seal poaching until the nations interested in it co-operate. And when they do, as they have for the past twenty years, all this work can be and has been carried on by a few revenue cutters.

The "strong navy" is justified by its services to commerce and trade; and it is asserted that "the navy is one of

the foundations of national credit and is insurance against the unsettled conditions of trade and commerce which would be coincident with a reputation for naval weakness." This is adequately answered by the fact that certain lesser powers, such as Norway and Sweden, Denmark and Holland, enjoy credit and trade conditions that are equal, if not superior, to those of the great naval powers.

As to insurance, it is foolish to take out an insurance policy on fireproof structures. And as far as the navy claims to insure or protect the great bulk of American property and commerce, this is exactly what is being done; for great parts of our country and of its trade are absolutely secure from any possible invasion or foe. The analogy of navy protection to insurance is defective in another respect: for in ordinary insurance the man who receives the benefits pays the premium, whereas, in the case of the navy, if it protects commerce at all—as it certainly does not in time of peace—the whole country pays the premium for the benefit of the group interested in foreign trade. One is also forced to question the character of insurance which, without increasing security, merely becomes more expensive every time the premium is paid. We build a dreadnaught or two under the impression that we are making our commerce securer; hence we are told that our contributions are like premiums on insurance. Our "possible foe" does likewise. In retaliation we increase our premiums; again he follows. And so on indefinitely. Yet in the end our commerce is not one whit safer than it was at the beginning. Does such insurance insure? Certainly it is not what is ordinarily meant by insurance.

Several reasons assert the inadequacy of other means of settlement. This is not only opinion, but it is opinion

that disagrees with the general facts of the case. To begin with, the other means have never been given the trial that force has had. They never have had even an appreciable percentage of the money spent upon them that armies and navies have had. Furthermore, when they have been tried they have succeeded remarkably well, for up to the present time no case of true international arbitration has failed of acceptance.

This failure to test other means adequately is apparent in the case of the Monroe Doctrine. This Doctrine is maintained at an enormous cost to our country, and the Navy League avers that we must devote even more money to this purpose. Now, in so far as the Monroe Doctrine is designed to maintain the peace of the Western Hemisphere it meets the approval of all persons, whether militarists or not. It does not follow, however, that we are justified in appointing ourselves as policemen. Not alone we, but all other American states, have a right to participate in maintaining peace in this hemisphere. There are those who feel that the same end — that is, peace — can be achieved, and more cheaply and effectively, by supporting the Pan-American Movement instead of the Monroe Doctrine; but the former receives practically no backing in comparison to the latter, certainly not from the Navy League. And the policy and talk of these advocates of the Monroe Doctrine, to be enforced by a large navy, give color to the "North American Peril" known to our southern sister states.

When a government adopts a policy it presumably has some end in view, and presumably will abandon a policy when it has achieved that end or when the conditions which gave birth to it are no more. The Monroe Doctrine was originally designed to express opposition to

the extension of the political and territorial systems of Europe to this side of the water. It was adopted when American states were weak. Now that these states have grown strong and are able to take care of themselves, and that Europe has largely adopted a political system like our own, the Monroe Doctrine has served its original purpose. There is no longer danger that Europe will try to establish a monarchical system on this side of the water. And as far as Europe's attempting to gain territory on this side of the water is concerned, surely our sister states are as much interested in that as we; and it would be better to co-operate with them to prevent it, than to drive them into friendship and perhaps alliance with Europe against us by our overweening attitude.

Recently an unsuccessful attempt was made in the Lodge Resolution (the President refusing to sign it) to give the Monroe Doctrine a commercial significance. Though it masqueraded under the same name, it was not the Monroe Doctrine at all. It proposed a policy which could easily be developed into the closed door in the Western Hemisphere. To assert the closed door here, and at the same time insist on the open door in China by naval force — which is an alleged achievement of our navy commended by the Navy League (Reason 23) — is inconsistent. It is more than that — it is unjust, and therefore a source of danger. It raises the suspicion and resentment of Spanish America. So that, though we are now told that we need a strong navy to protect our weaker sisters against Europe, we shall presently be told that we need a stronger navy to protect us from these grown-up sisters, who on reaching their majority have refused longer to tolerate our interference and complacent superiority. Assuredly Pan-Americanism seems

to have more possibilities for peace, than a navy-supported Monroe Doctrine. The point at issue is not merely how largely the navy has supported a national policy, but also, and chiefly, how just that policy is. If we have vicious policies backed by force we should enthrone the wrong; for, if it is true, as one of the "reasons" states, that "might does not make right, but right backed by might is irresistible," it follows that wrong backed by might is also irresistible. *The question is not what might can achieve, but what is right!* A commission of the kind advocated by the Navy League would do well to investigate the justice of our national policies rather than to advocate an unlimited navy to put unjust policies into execution.

History is adduced to show the need for a strong navy. "The Union was preserved, and the outcome of the War of Secession was determined, as much by the blockading navy as by the army of the North." Now all that can be concluded from this is that we ought to have had a large navy at *the time of the Civil War*; or, to be more exact, after the war began. For, what possible profit would there have been had the navy been a hundred times as large as it was, when the conflict began? It would simply have meant, as in the case of the army, that about one-half of the naval forces of the United States would have joined the Confederacy. Unless it be shown that present conditions are the same, the past cannot be used to prove the need of a larger navy to-day. At all events, history cannot be used so casually and freely as is done by the Navy League. Its reasons based on history exhibit an admirable freedom in dealing with the past. Indeed, history is simply made to order. Let one example test the "reasons" based on history. "The navy

fought and won the war of 1812." This may be described as a pious fraud, committed in the name of patriotism. 'The navy *fought* the war'—as though the army had done nothing! 'And the navy *won* the war'; when the truth is that, despite victorious engagements on the ocean and the Lakes, by October, 1813, there was not a single ship in the whole American navy available for the protection of our sea-coast against the successful blockade and landing expedition of the British; that we were most anxious to secure peace; that Great Britain refused to give any guarantees respecting impressments and search, which were the causes of the war, and that these claims were surrendered in practice—not because of us or our navy—but because the European conditions which had given rise to them had passed with Napoleon; that certain questions which could not be settled at the peace negotiations were left to arbitration, and were, after a century of bickering and threatening, finally and successfully settled in 1910 by the *Hague Tribunal!* History treated in this way, will prove almost anything. But even after being disfigured as is here shown, the war of 1812 does not argue, as the Navy League assumes, that we need a larger navy in 1912.

The unexpectedness of war, and necessity of being prepared, are the best of the "reasons" for a navy; which, as stated, "cannot be improvised." Most men will agree that one cannot keep his tools too sharp; but that is no reason for filling the entire premises with the costliest of tools. Enough good tools for the work in hand is what is wanted. And this brings us to the heart of the whole matter: *the question to be answered is, What is our actual need in sea power?*

The Circular of the Navy League does not answer that question. Its sixty-seven reasons simply advocate

a larger navy. Few of these reasons can be accepted as absolutely true; none of them, even if granted, demonstrates that our navy is weak, and ought to be increased. But they do show one thing conclusively: that a Commission appointed under such auspices, and actuated by such reasons, would be a highly injurious and costly experiment.

The composition of the much needed commission to investigate our need for a navy, is, then, of the highest importance. To appoint naval officers solely, would have no point. We already know what they are likely to say. What we want is a commission which shall honestly investigate what present or prospective enemies we have, how largely their enmity is provoked by us or by our policies, how much this friction could be reduced by honorable and peaceful means (such as peace commissions, Pan-Americanism, immunity of private property at sea), how much effort and money we could with advantage devote to these peaceful means; and in view of these things, how large an army and navy we need *for defense*. We want this commission to investigate what influences at home are advocating and opposing naval expansion, how taxation for military purposes is affecting the people and its relation to the government, how real the alleged services of army and navy in the field of science, education and charity are; in short we want a commission that will give us a naval program based on the honest facts.

Such a commission must obviously be composed of men who represent the several interests of our country, and not of special pleaders. It must consist of honest men, men who respect history, who have primarily the interests of the country and of humanity, and not of some branch of the service, at heart.

APPENDIX

(From the Circular of the Navy League, the numbers being added for reference.)

SIXTY-SEVEN REASONS FOR A STRONG NAVY

The navy legislation of pressing importance referred to, naturally involves the consideration of why the United States should maintain a strong navy, and we therefore respectfully submit for your consideration the following sixty-seven reasons and aphorisms bearing thereon:

SEA POWER AND HISTORY

1. Sea power was indispensable to the success of the War of the Revolution.
2. The navy suppressed the war on commerce by the Pirates of the Barbary States.
3. The navy fought and won the War of 1812.
4. The Union was preserved, and the outcome of the War of Secession was determined, as much by the blockading navy as by the army of the North.
5. National humiliation to the United States following naval weakness was illustrated by the humiliating treatment accorded to American seamen in Cuba by Spain in 1873.
6. The navy decided the outcome of the Spanish War, which would never have taken place had Spain known our navy's strength.
7. England's navy has given Great Britain uninterrupted peace on the water for nearly one hundred years and her shores have not been successfully invaded for nearly a thousand years.
8. China's policy of evading militarism on both land and sea has been accompanied by disastrous defeats and untold humiliation.
9. Germany was once defenceless and her enemies swarmed her borders and took possession of her land.
10. Germany with an adequate army and navy has been practically free from war on land or sea for forty years and more.
11. Turkey lost Tripoli because of pitiful naval weakness.

NATIONAL DEFENCE

12. The navy is our main defence.
13. Undefended resources invite aggression.
14. The navy has 21,000 miles of coast line to defend.
15. The United States navy has more harbors with large cities and a larger number of strategic points to defend than has any other nation's navy.

16. The navy must defend Porto Rico, the Philippine Islands, the Hawaiian Islands, and the Panama Canal.

17. "Better to be despised for too anxious apprehensions than be ruined by too confident security."

AMERICAN POLICIES

The effectiveness of the following American policies depends finally on a strong navy, viz.:

18. The Monroe Doctrine,* particularly in its relation to the West Indies and lands north of the Amazon.

19. The attitude of the United States as to possession or ownership of strategic alien harbors and coaling stations.

20. The neutrality of the Panama Canal, including the necessary safeguarding incident to the passage through the canal of the ships of belligerents, when other nations are at war.

21. The restriction of Asiatic immigration.

22. The integrity of China.

23. The open door of trade in China.

24. Equal rights for American citizens traveling abroad, regardless of blood and religion.

FROM THE STANDPOINT OF ECONOMICS

25. Battleships are cheaper than battles.

26. The money for American battleships is paid to American working-men, American builders, and American craftsmen.

27. The Navy Department's demand for higher qualities of steel and better mechanical devices has aided directly in America's success in the production of high grade steel and in the building of bridges, bicycles, automobiles, and aeroplanes.

28. The navy is a school of efficiency, teaching many trades; teaching discipline and cleanliness to young men, a large portion of whom are so young that they can hardly be considered as producing units.

29. The navy as a trade school has been called "Our Great

*NOTE 1.—The Monroe Doctrine went by default from 1862 to 1865 because it could not be enforced during our Civil War. Napoleon III, wishing to colonize Mexico, placed Maximilian on the throne, through the aid of the French army, and against the protests of the United States. The close of the Civil War enabled the President to send Sheridan and the army to the Mexican borders and naval vessels to the Mexican coasts. Napoleon then withdrew his troops, Maximilian was captured, and the Monroe Doctrine was again in force.

NOTE 2.—The Monroe Doctrine was again upheld by the presence of the United States battleship fleet during the critical period when Germany and Great Britain virtually declared war against Venezuela.

NOTE 3.—Land hunger and land grabbing are as much in evidence to-day as in any period of the world's history.

National University." It returns to civil life annually as many trained, efficient, and patriotic young men as are graduated from the five leading universities of the country.

30. Germany's prosperity and national efficiency can, to no small extent, be attributed to the training received by citizens in her army and navy.

31. The annual cost of the navy, which is about \$130,000,000 for 1912, is cheap insurance against the cost of war, and represents approximately the cost of the nation's automobile tires for 1912.

32. The navy is one of the foundations of national credit and is insurance against the unsettled conditions of trade and commerce which would be co-incident with a reputation for naval weakness.

OUTSIDE THE SPHERE OF WAR

The following services have been rendered by the navy:

33. The suppression of the African slave trade.

34. The suppression of piracy.

35. The opening of Japan.

36. The opening of Korea.

37. Arctic exploration and relief.

38. Protection of the fur seals.

39. Pioneer work of Coast and Geodetic Survey.

40. The establishment of light-house service.

41. Pioneer work of the Weather Bureau.

42. The work of the Naval Observatory and Hydrographic Office.

43. Explorations and preliminary surveys for various Isthmian Canal routes.

44. Frequent protection of missionaries and citizens abroad.

45. Frequent prevention of insurrection in the West Indies and the Southern Republics.

46. Friendly offices to Cuba, Panama, San Domingo and Nicaragua.

47. Repeated earthquake and famine relief at Messina, Martinique and San Francisco; in Ireland and elsewhere.

DIPLOMACY

48. The weight of a powerful navy gives force to diplomacy.

49. Naval power is a legitimate factor in international settlements, because it is the evidence of national efficiency.

NATIONAL PRESTIGE

50. George Washington said: "There is a rank due to the United States among nations which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost, by the reputation of weakness. If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it. If we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war."

PEACE PROGRAMS

51. Disarmament and obligatory arbitration are incompatible.

52. Armament may be the instrument to force the adversary to arbitrate.

53. The general arbitration treaties adopted at the Second Hague Conference and other international treaties failed to prevent the forcible annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria; the seizure of Tripoli by Italy; the invasion of Persia by Russia, and the terrible war in the Balkans.

54. The military powers of Europe declined to enter into the Second Hague Conference if the limitation of armament were included in the program of subjects for consideration.

55. Arbitrators' decisions have not always been accepted.

56. Navies will be needed to enforce the decree of a Court of Arbitration.

57. "Adequate armament and effective arbitration are correlative agencies for national security and for international peace and justice."

PEACE

58. "Wouldst thou conjure upon any country the clouds of war—induce its government to disarm."

59. "Obviously, the permanent peace of the world can be secured only through the gradual concentration of the preponderant military strength into the hands of the most pacific communities."

60. Power and strength are essential for the noble task of peace maker.

GENERAL REASONS

61. The unexpectedness of war.

62. A modern navy can not be improvised.

63. In the family of nations, any one disturbing element may cause a brawl.

64. Might does not make right, but right backed by might is irresistible.

65. Negative righteousness means abstaining from evil, but positive righteousness may require a fight against evil.

66. "When the great interests of a nation, her dignity, her rights, the resources of her livelihood or even her liberty and her honor are at stake, men are in duty bound to go to war, to wage battle and risk their lives. There are considerations in this world which are higher than human lives. There are super-human interests, there are ideals dearer than our own persons, for which it is worth while struggling, suffering, fighting and dying. Life is not the highest boon of existence, and no sentimental reasons based on the notion of the sacredness of life, will abolish struggle in the world or make war impossible."

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